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We discover the mechanism for the transition from self-segregation (into opposing groups) to
clustering (towards cautious behaviors) in the evolutionary minority game (EMG). The mechanism
is illustrated with a statistical mechanics analysis of a simplified EMG involving three groups of
agents: two groups of opposing agents and one group of cautious agents. Two key factors affect the
population distribution of the agents. One is the market impact (the self-interaction), which has
been identified previously. The other is the market inefficiency due to the short-time imbalance in
the number of agents using opposite strategies. Large market impact favors “extreme” players who
choose fixed strategies, while large market inefficiency favors cautious players. The phase transition
depends on the number of agents (N), the reward-to-fine ratio (R), as well as the wealth reduction
threshold (d) for switching strategy. When the rate for switching strategy is large, there is strong
clustering of cautious agents. On the other hand, when N is small, the market impact becomes
large, and the extreme behavior is favored.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 87.23.Ge, 02.50.Le
Complex adaptive systems are ubiquitous in social, bi-
ological and economic sciences. In these systems agents
adapt to the changes in the global environment, which
are induced by the actions of the agents themselves. The
main theme in the study of complex systems is to un-
derstand the emergent properties in the global dynamics.
Of particular interest are the systems in which the agents
have no direct interaction but compete to be in the mi-
nority; they modify their behaviors (strategies) based on
the past experiences [1, 2]. Examples of such systems
include financial markets [3], rush-hour traffic [4], and
ecological systems. In the context of demand and supply
in economic systems, the idea of the minority game is
particularly relevant. If the demand is larger than the
supply, the price of the goods will increase; this benefits
the sellers who are in the minority. Many agent based
models of economic systems and financial markets indeed
incorporate the essence of the minority game.
In this letter we shall focus on the EMG proposed by
Johnson, et al [5]. The model is defined as follows. There
are N (odd number) agents. At each round they choose to
enter Room 0 (sell a stock or choose route A) or Room
1 (buy a stock or choose route B). At the end of each
round the agents in the room with fewer agents (in the
minority) win a point; while the agents in the room with
more agents (in the majority) lose a point. The winning
room numbers (0 or 1) are recorded, and they form a his-
torical record of the game. All agents share the common
memory containing the outcomes from the most recent
occurrences of all 2m possible bit strings of length m.
The basic strategy is derived from the common memory
and is changing dynamically. Given the current m− bit
string, the basic strategy is simply to choose the win-
ning room number after the most recent pattern of same
m − bit string in the historical record. To use the basic
strategy is thus to follow the trend. In the EMG each
agent is assigned a probability p: he will adopt the ba-
sic strategy with probability p and adopt the opposite
of the basic strategy with probability 1 − p. The agents
with p = 0 or p = 1 are “extreme” players, while the
agents with p = 1/2 are cautious players. The game and
its outcomes evolve as less successful agents attempt to
modify their p values. This is achieved by allowing the
agents with the accumulated wealth less than d (d < 0)
to change their p values. In the original EMG model, the
new p value is chosen randomly in the interval of width
∆p centered around its original p value. His wealth is
reset to zero and the game continues. Thus in the EMG
the agents constantly learn frommistakes and adapt their
strategies as the game evolves.
A remarkable feature emerges from the study of the
EMG: the agents self-segregate into two opposing ex-
treme groups with p ∼ 0 and p ∼ 1 [5, 6, 7]. This
conclusion is rather robust; it does not depend on N , d,
∆p, m, or the initial distribution of p. The final distri-
bution always has symmetric U-shape. This leads to the
following conclusion: in order to succeed in a completive
society the agent must take extreme positions (either al-
ways follows a basic strategy or goes against it). This
behavior can be explained by the market impact of the
agents’ own actions which largely penalizes the cautious
agents [7]. By introducing the reward-to-fine ratio R,
Hod and Nakar found that the above conclusion is only
robust when R ≥ 1. When R < 1 there is a tendency to
cluster towards cautious behaviors and the distribution of
the p value, P (p), may evolve to an inverted-U shape with
the peak at the middle. In some ranges of the parameters
M-shape distributions are also observed. To explain the
clustering of cautious agents, Hod gives a phenomeno-
logical theory relating the accumulated wealth reduction
to a random walk with time-dependent oscillating prob-
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FIG. 1: The distribution P(p) for R=0.971 and d = −4. A
set of values of N = 101, 735, 1467, 2935, 5869, and 10001 are
used. The distribution is obtained by averaging over 100,000
time steps and 10 independent runs
abilities [10]. However, the dynamical mechanism for the
phase transition is not clear. This letter aims to present
such mechanism from the analysis based on statistical
mechanics.
We first present our numerical results which show
that the transition from self-segregation to clustering is
generic for R < 1. We have performed extensive sim-
ulations of EMG for a wide range of the values of the
parameters, N,R, and d. The transition depends on
all three parameters, N , R, and d. Figure 1 shows
the distribution P (p) for R = 0.971, d = −4, and
N = 101, 735, 1467, 2935, 5869 and 10001. For a given
R (< 1) and d, we observe the transition from self-
segregation to clustering as the number of agents N in-
creases. The shape of the distribution P (p) changes from
a U-shape to an inverted U shape (near the transition
point P (p) has M-shape). The standard deviation σp of
the distribution decreases as N increases. We define the
critical value Nc as the value of N when σp equal to the
standard deviation of the uniform distribution, i.e. when
σ2p =
∫ 1
0
(p− 1/2)2P (p)dp equal to 1/12. Our results can
be summarized by the general expression for the criti-
cal value Nc =
[
|d|
A(1−R)
]2
, where A is a constant of order
one. Alternatively one might view the transition by vary-
ing d with fixed N and R. As |d| increases the system
changes from clustering to self-segregation. The critical
value is then given by |dc| = A(1−R)
√
N . Figure 2 plots
Nc vs |d| for various R. When R→ 1 the clustering only
occurs for very large N or very small |d|. At R = 1 the
clustering disappears and the behavior of self-segregation
becomes robust.
Hod and Nakar explain that R < 1 corresponds to diffi-
cult situations (tough environments) in which the agents
tend to be confused and indecisive and thus become cau-
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FIG. 2: The critical value |dc| vs N for R =
0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.94, and 0.975.
tious. We find that the rate of strategy switching (which
depends on both R and d) affect the distribution of the
agents more directly. For R < 1 the agent switches its
strategy every 2|d|/(1 − R) time steps on average. So
when R or |d| is small, the agents have less patience and
switch their strategies more frequently; this, as we ex-
plain below, causes large market inefficiency and thus
favors cautious agents. It is the rapid adaptation that
makes the agents “confused” and “indecisive”. On the
other hand, when the number of agents is small, the mar-
ket impact becomes large. Take for example a population
consists of only three agents with p = 0, 1/2, and 1 re-
spectively. The cautious agent (with p = 1/2) always
loses because he is always in the majority, while the ex-
treme agents are in the majority half of the times. In this
case the cautious agent experiences the full market im-
pact of his own action. Indeed our data show that when
N is small enough the self-segregation into extreme be-
haviors dominates.
We now show that the mechanism for clustering around
p = 1/2 and the transition to self-segregation can be
understood from a simplified model in which p takes only
three possible values p = 0, 1/2, and 1. The agents in
Group 0 (with p = 0) makes the opposite decision from
the agents in Group 1 (with p = 1). We denotes the group
with p = 1/2 “Group m”. The probability of winning
only depends on N0, Nm, N1, which are the respective
numbers of agents in Group 0, m, and 1.
We begin by evaluating the average wealth reduction
for the agents in each of the three groups. Let n be the
number of agents in Group m making the same decision
(let us call it decision A) as those in Group 0 (Nm − n
will then be the number of agents in Group m making
the same decision (decision B) as those in Group 1). If
N0+n < (Nm−n)+N1, or n < Nm/2+(N1−N0)/2, the
agents making decision A will win; when n > Nm/2 +
(N1−N0)/2, the agents making decision B will win. The
3winner has its wealth increased by R, while the loser has
its wealth reduced by 1. With N0, Nm, and N1 fixed, the
probability of winning depends on n.
When Nm ≫ 1, the distribution of n can be
approximated by a Gaussian distribution P (n) =
1√
2piσm
exp(−(n−Nm/2)2/(2σ2m)), where σm =
√
Nm/2.
Given the distribution, one can write down the average
wealth change for the agents in Group 0,
∆w0 = R
∫ Nm/2+Nd/2
0
P (n)dn−
∫ Nm
Nm/2+Nd/2
P (n)dn,
where Nd = N1 − N0. This can be rewritten in term of
the error function erf(x) = 2√
pi
∫ x
0 e
−t2dt,
∆w0 = −1−R
2
+
1 +R
2
erf
(
Nd
2
√
2σm
)
. (1)
Similarly we can derive the average wealth change for the
agents in Group 1,
∆w1 = −1−R
2
− 1 +R
2
erf
(
Nd
2
√
2σm
)
(2)
Since the number N0 and N1 are fluctuating, and on
the average N0 and N1 should be the same, we can av-
erage out the short time fluctuations in Nd. This allows
us to find out how the agents in the “extreme” groups
compare with the cautious agents in Group m in the long
run. The average wealth change of the agents in Group 0
and 1 is given by ∆we = (N0∆w0 +N1∆w1)/(N0 +N1).
Substituting the expressions for ∆w0 and ∆w1, we have
∆we = −1−R
2
− 1 +R
2
Nd
N0 +N1
erf
(
Nd
2
√
2σm
)
(3)
Note that the second term in ∆we, which is due to the
fluctuations in Nd, is always negative (since erf(x) is an
odd function). When N0 6= N1, the winning probabili-
ties for making decision A and decision B are not equal,
and the market is not efficient. Thus this term can be
interpreted as the cost due to market inefficiency. Large
market inefficiency on average penalize the players taking
“extreme” positions more.
For the agents in Group m, if n < Nm/2+Nd/2, then
n agents in the group win, while Nm − n agents in the
group lose. On the other hand, if n > Nm/2+Nd/2, then
Nm − n agents in the group win, but n agents lose. We
need to take these two cases into account when evaluating
the average.
∆wm =
1
Nm
[∫ Nm/2+Nd/2
0
(Rn− (Nm − n))P (n)dn
+
∫ Nm
Nm/2+Nd/2
(R(Nm − n)− n)P (n)dn
]
.
After a few algebraic steps, we arrive at
∆wm = −(1−R)/2− 1 +R√
2piNm
exp(−N2d/(2Nm)) (4)
The first term in ∆m is the same as that in ∆e. The
second term can be interpreted as the market impact [7].
The magnitude of the term is in fact the largest when
Nd = 0. Large market impact (self-interaction) penalizes
the cautious players; their own decisions increase their
chances of being in the majority and hence their chances
of losing.
To determine the transition from clustering to self-
segregation, we need to calculate the distribution of Nd
which allows us to evaluate ∆we and ∆wm. Let us de-
note the change in Nd in one time step as δN . On av-
erage δN = 2N0/(|d|/((1−R)/2)) = N0(1−R)/|d|; this
is the average number of extreme agents switching their
strategies per time step (adaptation rate). The factor 2
is included because the agent only loses about half of the
times. |d|/((1−R)/2) is the average time step taken be-
fore the wealth threshold is reached. The dynamics of Nd
can be described as a random walk with mean reversal
(there is a higher probability moving towards Nd = 0).
The individual step of the walk is given by ±δN . The
probability for changing from Nd to Nd+ δN is given by
W+(Nd), and the probability for changing to Nd − δN
is given by W−, where W± = 12 [1 ∓ erf(Nd/(2
√
2σm)].
The steady state probability distribution Q(Nd) for Nd
should satisfy
Q(Nd) = W−(Nd + δN)Q(Nd + δN)
+W+(Nd − δN))Q(Nd − δN). (5)
For small δN one can convert the above equation to a
differential equation. The solution of Q(Nd) is given by
Q(Nd) ∝ exp(− 2
δN
∫ Nd
0
erf(
n
2
√
2σm
)dn) (6)
Now we average ∆we and ∆wm over the distribution of
Q(Nd). We can easily obtain that
∆we = −1−R
2
− (1 +R)
2
δN
2(N0 +N1)
(7)
∆wm, on the other hand, is given by
∆wm = −(1−R)/2− 1 +R√
2piNm
< exp(−N2d/(2Nm)) >,
where the average is over the distribution Q(Nd). This
can be approximated as
∆wm ∼ −1−R
2
− 1 +R√
2pi
1√
Nm + σ2d
,
since in the range Nd < σm, where the main contri-
bution to the average comes from, Q(Nd) can be well
4approximated by a Gaussian distribution centered at
zero with width σd =
√√
2pi
2
√
σmδN . At the critical
point, N0 = N1 = Nm = N/3, and ∆we = ∆wm. It
is easy to verify that this occurs when δN ∼ √Nm.
As δN = N0(1 − R)/|d|, the crossover value for |d| is
|dc| = A0(1−R)
√
N , where A0 is a constant of the order
one.
In the above derivation we simply use the averaged
value for δN . This underestimates the magnitude of
∆we. For R close to 1, the strategy switching in the
“extreme” group is rather intermittent. There are no
agents switching strategy for many time steps, but in a
single step many agents in the group switch strategies.
A loss at a single round, for example, will not make the
agents in the extreme group to switch strategy if they
had won in the previous two rounds. We can take this
intermittency into account, by introducing the probabil-
ity z that strategy switching occurs in the extreme group
after it loses. We leave out the case δN = 0, since it
does not affect the distribution of Nd. The average δN
is now N0(1 − R)/(z|d|). The crossover value for d is
then given by |dc| = (A0/z)(1− R)
√
N ≡ A(1 −R)
√
N .
If δN is close to its averaged value and z ∼ 1, A is
of the order one. The broader the distribution of δN
and the larger the intermittency in strategy switching
among the agents in the extreme groups, the larger the
value of A. One can estimate the upper bound for A
as follows. The probability z and δN are related to the
wealth distribution of the agents in the extreme groups.
The minimum width of the wealth distribution is |d|, so
δN < N/|d|. The upper bound in dc is thus obtained
with δN = N/d and z = 1 − R; this leads to dc ∼
√
N ,
or A ∼ 1/(1− R). Figure 3 shows A vs N for various R
values. One can see that A becomes independent of N
for sufficiently large N (this means that |dc| ∝
√
N holds
well numerically). The value of A indeed approaches the
upper bound A0/(1−R) for the three-group EMG when
N > 1/(1− R)2. This can be understood by the follow-
ing simple argument: The width of the wealth distribu-
tion is close to |d| when |d| is greater than the wealth
fluctuation, which is roughly
√
d/(1−R), given that the
average time for strategy switching is about |d|/(1−R).
Thus when |d| > 1/(1−R) or N > 1/(1−R)2, the upper
bound for A is reached. However, this is likely to be the
unique feature for the three-group EMG model. For the
original EMG the value of A is of order one for a wide
range of R, as can also be seen from Figure 3.
The theory can be generalized to the original EMG
model by generalizing the definition of Nd to Nd = 2(p¯−
1/2), where p¯ is the average of the p values among all
the agents at a given time step. The market inefficiency
is again measured by the fluctuation in Nd. Consider
the version in which the agent choose a new p randomly
when its wealth is below d, then we can argue that δN
(the average change in Nd) is again given by δN ∼ N(1−
N
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FIG. 3: A vs N for various values of R. The results from
the three-group EMG and the original EMG with random
redistribution are shown
R)/|d|. So we have |dc| = A0(1−R)
√
N ; this works well
because the fluctuation of δN is likely to be much smaller
in the original model than in the three-group model. We
can also understand the version of the model in which the
new p value is chosen in the interval of width δp around
the old p value. Since a smaller δp leads to a smaller
δN , the cost due to market inefficiency is reduced. This
favors the “extreme” agents (|dc| is smaller for a smaller
δp); it is consistent with the results obtained in Ref. [11].
Ref. [9] found that the periodic boundary condition used
in the redistribution of the p value favors clustering. This
is also not surprising. When the boundary condition is
periodic in p, δN is effectively increased, because some
p = 0 agents can switch to p = 1 agents, even when δp is
small.
In conclusion, we have derived a general formalism for
studying the transition from clustering to self-segregation
based on the statistical mechanics of a simplified three-
group model. We find that frequent strategy switching
leads to market inefficiency which favors the clustering of
cautious agents. A general expression relating the num-
ber of agents, the wealth threshold, and the reward-to-
fine ratio at the critical point is derived. This expression
is found to be equally valid for the general EMG.
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